Sticky information monetary models have been used in the macroeconomic literature to explain some of the observed features regarding inflation dynamics. In this paper, we explore the consequences of relaxing the rational expectations assumption usually taken in this type of model; in particular, by considering expectations formed through adaptive learning, it is possible to arrive to results other than the trivial convergence to a fixed point long-term equilibrium. The results involve the possibility of endogenous cyclical motion (periodic and a-periodic), which emerges essentially in scenarios of hyperinflation. In low inflation settings, the introduction of learning implies a less severe impact of monetary shocks that, nevertheless, tend to last for additional time periods relative to the pure perfect foresight setup.
Introduction
The sticky information paradigm was born as a reply to the New Keynesian price stickiness setup, widely used in monetary policy analysis (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler [3] and Wo o dford [23] ). Mankiw and Reis [8] have stressed that their interpretation of monetary policy has the virtue of …t t i n g better a series of macroeconomic facts. Unlike the New Keynesian model, the MankiwReis sticky information framework is able to explain how and why: (i) in ‡ation is persistent; (ii) monetary policy shocks have a delayed and gradual e¤ect on in ‡ation; (iii) desin ‡ations are always contractionary. Above all, the sticky information setup may be viewed as an alternative to a paradoxical point of the New Keynesian approach: a model that has in its essence the prevalence of price rigidity is a model in which in ‡ation changes fast; it cannot replicate the in ‡ation inertia found in empirical evidence.
The information stickiness model imposes no constraint on the timing of pricing decisions. Firms can modify prices whenever they choose, however there is a constraint on information propagation: information concerning macroeconomic conditions di¤uses slowly throughout the economy, making price changes to be often decided on the basis of outdated information. The slow information di¤usion is assumed to be the result of the costs of acquiring and processing information, i.e., the costs of re-optimization. As the result of the sticky information hypothesis, the economy's current price level becomes a function of the weighted average of past expectations concerning the present state of the economy, with each …r m having updated its information set at any past date, a decision that is independent of the same decision made by any other …r m .
The initial version of the model was relatively straightforward: it focused essentially on the shape of the Phillips curve and the model was closed with a simple money demand equation. The same authors have then sophisticated and complemented the model in various directions. First, Mankiw and Reis [9] explicitly integrate into the model the dynamics of wages and productivity; the additional conclusion is that productivity slowdowns have a same type of impact as desin ‡ations, i.e., they both lead to an employment trajectory that falls below the full information employment level. Second, Reis [15] [16] builds a theory of inattentiveness that provides the microfoundations for the sticky information approach; both producers and consumers face costs of acquiring, absorbing and processing information and these costs have to be taken into account when agents solve their optimal control problems (in practice, the standard pro…t maximization and utility maximization problems will involve an additional constraint relating information costs). The result is an optimal degree of inattentiveness, i.e., agents rationally choose to be inattentive to news, updating information on a sporadic basis. Rational inattention is also modelled resorting to alternative approaches, as in Sims [19] who alternatively to an intertemporal optimization approach supports the analysis of limited ability to process information on the modelling of a communication channel with …n i t e Shannon capacity.
A third relevant extension of the information stickiness model consists in the attempt to combine the framework's central assumption with a general equilibrium setting. This is what Mankiw and Reis [10] [11] suggest. In this new setting, inattentiveness is pervasive: all the agents in the economy, i.e., consumers, …r m s and workers, choose to update the corresponding set of information only sporadically, meaning that past expectations on present events will be a common feature of the various central macroeconomic relations: the Phillips curve, the IS curve and a wage curve. Prices, consumption plans and wages are all set, to some extent, based on outdated information. The relevant fact concerning this version of the model is that it proves better at matching key empirical facts concerning economic ‡u c t u a t i o n s than the less sophisticated model in which only …r m s resort to outdated information to decide about their activity.
This paper intends to o¤er an additional contribution to the sticky information literature, by exploring the consequences of departing from the rational expectations assumption. To undertake the analysis, we restrict the model to a deterministic setting. 1 Under perfect foresight, the predictions of the sticky information model are rather simple: the in ‡ation rate will converge to the rate of money supply, and it will remain on this value as long as the equilibrium remains undisturbed. Nevertheless, information stickiness continues to have a relevant role in such a purely deterministic setting: the degree of information stickiness will indicate the velocity of convergence towards the equilibrium point. If there is no stickiness, the adjustment is instantaneous; on the contrary, if the information stickiness is absolute, the in ‡ation level remains …x e d and no convergence occurs. Between these extreme circumstances, a lower degree of information stickiness is synonymous of faster adjustment. The main point is that independently of the degree of sluggishness in updating information, convergence to the steady state is guaranteed under perfect foresight (except in the unrealistic case in which information is never updated). Once we depart from rational expectations, di¤erent equilibrium outcomes are eventually obtained and ‡u c t u a t i o n s may be endogenously triggered and not 1 Although, at the end of the paper (section 7), the possibility of stochastic shocks is introduced in order to address impulse-response dynamics in the discussed scenario.
just the result of extrinsic forces.
To depart from perfect foresight, we will consider that agents have access to two sets of information: (i) information about the state of the economy, which is updated only sporadically and (ii) information about the past behavior of the assumed endogenous variable(s) (in the case, the in ‡ation rate), which is known by all agents in every time period and that allows to learn the current value of the variable(s). Agents that have updated their information about the state of the economy in the past may have insu¢ cient data in order to predict perfectly today's outcomes and they will resort essentially to past performance data on the variable in order to predict or learn the current value; on the contrary, agents who have updated information on the state of the economy recently will be able, to a large extent, to form rational expectations and therefore will not need to largely resort to learning. The learning component of expectations is modelled in a trivial way: we consider an adaptive learning algorithm under which the growth rate of the price level is estimated resorting to a simple least squares regression applied over a perceived law of motion for prices.
The characterization of the dynamics of the model, involving the above mentioned expectations assumptions, will attribute relevance to four parameters: the income elasticity of money demand, a parameter measuring real rigidities, the degree of information stickiness and the growth rate of money supply. For a large set of possible combinations of parameters, stability is found, i.e., there is convergence to the monetary steady state that prevails under perfect foresight. Two-period, quasi-periodic and chaotic cycles are found, following a ‡i p bifurcation, for a signi…cant level of information stickiness and a strong rate of growth of money supply. Endogenous cycles are, in this model, attached to scenarios of hyperin ‡ation. This is a relevant result since some studies, e.g. Marcet and Sargent [13] and Marcet and Nicolini [12] , point precisely to an association between fast growth of the price level and learning processes with outcomes that may deviate from the perfect foresight equilibrium.
Studies on the empirical validity of the sticky-information Phillips curve (e.g., Khan and Zhu [7] , Dopke et al. [5] and Coibion [4] , among others), point to an acceptable …t between evidence and models based on the stickyinformation assumption; furthermore, as Reis [17] highlights, the observed misalignments between the data and the time series generated by the theoretical structure are not mainly caused by inattentiveness / information sluggishness, but rather by the assumption that in these models agents will form expectations on the grounds of perfect rationality, given the information sets they face. Such an evidence furnishes a strong motivation to continue exploring the sticky-information setup, analyzing it further beyond the rational expectations / perfect foresight benchmark framework. By exploring distinct assumptions concerning the formation of expectations, one will possibly …n d new avenues for achieving a better match with the data and also to attribute a stronger logical coherence to the modelling structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sticky information model. In section 3 the dynamics of the model under rational expectations is addressed. Section 4 introduces adaptive learning and proposes a rule concerning the formation of aggregate expectations. Sections 5 and 6 proceed with the dynamic analysis of the model, both locally and in a global perspective. Section 7 studies how a monetary policy shock impacts on the long-run evolution of the in ‡ation rate, allowing to compare the response to shocks between the scenarios of full rationality and learning. Finally, section 8 concludes. Three appendices are also added at the end of the paper: appendix A derives the central dynamic equation of the model; appendix B indicates how the model could be sophisticated through the introduction of a more complex monetary policy structure, namely by resorting to an IS relation; in appendix C we change the rule governing the formation of expectations, in order to further explore the implications of learning in the sticky information environment and to evaluate the robustness of the sticky-information / adaptive learning analytical structure.
The Sticky Information Model: General Features
The presentation of the sticky information model follows closely the setup by Mankiw and Reis [8] ; thus, we just present the basic features of the model that are necessary for the discussion that follows in next sections. In the considered environment, prices are fully ‡e x i b l e in the sense that …r m s have the possibility of changing them in every time period. However, agents may be inattentive and, thus, base their pricing decisions on outdated information. As remarked in Reis [15] [16], …r m s ' i n a t t e nt i ve n e s s is not necessarily a synonymous of lack of rationality; an optimal degree of inattentiveness arises as the result of equating bene…ts of price changes and costs of acquiring and processing information. Therefore, relevant information will di¤use slowly throughout the economy, as …r m s choose to optimally update their information set only sporadically, remaining inattentive in the time length between adjustment dates. Let p t 2 R be the logarithm of the price level and y t 2 R the logarithm of the output gap. The output gap is de…ned as the di¤erence between e¤ective and potential output. Consider as well a parameter >0 de…ning a measure of sensitivity of the …r m 's target price to the output gap. Firms are monopolistically competitive, produce a single homogeneous good and act optimally to derive the following target price:
Equation (1) reveals that …r m s will desire to maintain the existing price only if there is a coincidence between e¤ective and potential output at date t; otherwise, the target price will rise above the observable price level when …r m s are faced with a positive output gap, and the target price will fall below p t in the opposite circumstance.
Parameter has an important role in the analysis and therefore we should further clarify its meaning. This parameter is also known as re ‡ecting 'r e a l rigidities' and according to Romer [18] such real rigidities may involve the following items: thick-market externalities, economies of scale and agglomeration economies, …n a n c i a l market imperfections, imperfect information that makes existing consumers more responsive to increases in prices than potential consumers are to price decreases, just to cite some of the most relevant.
Under the assumption of sticky information, a …r m that last updated its price plans j periods ago will set a price that corresponds to the expectations formed in period t j concerning the target price in t, i.e., p j t = E t j p t with p j t the price set by a …r m in t when the …r m updated its information in period t j.
Aggregation of individual prices will follow a mechanism similar to the one introduced by Calvo [2] concerning nominal rigidities. It is assumed that, at each time moment, a share of …r m s 2 [0; 1] collects information on the state of the economy and updates prices resorting to such information; the other …r m s also set prices in a given time moment but resorting to outdated information. If = 1, there is full information ‡e x i b i l i t y [rule (1) is applied in every moment by every …r m ] ; if = 0, there are no …r m s updating information, and therefore prices remain constant. In practice, it is admissible to consider that some intermediate level of information updating exists and thus is some value between 0 and 1 with the degree of information sluggishness rising as becomes closer to the lower bound of the interval.
In Reis [15] , it is demonstrated that in an economy with many agents the distribution of information updating converges to a Poisson distribution, implying that each …r m has an equal probability of being one of the …r m s updating prices with the most recent information, independently of the date of the last information review. The aggregate price level will be the weighted average of the prices set by each one of the …r m s what, under the Poisson process, translates into
Replacing, in this expression, each …r m 's price by the expected target price j periods ago and having in consideration equation (1) , aggregate prices in period t will be given by
In expression (2), the aggregate price level is basically the direct result of two assumptions: reaction of each …r m to the output gap in triggering price changes and information stickiness.
De…ning t := p t p t 1 as the in ‡ation rate and g t := y t y t 1 as the growth rate of the output gap, simple algebra allows to transform the price equation (2) into the well known sticky information Phillips curve,
Equation (3) indicates the existence of a contemporaneous relation between the output gap and in ‡ation; besides this, today's in ‡ation rate is determined by past expectations concerning the current state of the economy.
To proceed with the analysis of the model, some consideration about monetary policy must be added. In appendix (appendix A at the end of the paper), we show how a simple equation describing the equilibrium in the money market, combined with the displayed Phillips relation, allows for presenting the dynamics of in ‡ation as follows:
In equation (4), m is a constant rate of money growth and >0 is a parameter measuring the income elasticity of money demand. The second part of the appendix (appendix B) discusses how one could sophisticate the model by considering a more structured approach to monetary policy. The choice of a simple rule of adjustment of money supply to demand conditions is justi…ed on the basis of proposing a framework that is analytically tractable in a simple way once we introduce learning.
It is the study of the dynamics underlying equation (4) that will concern us in the following sections. It can be interpreted as the reduced form of the sticky information model. If one de…nes the steady state as the scenario in which in ‡ation remains constant, it is straightforward to obtain the monetary steady state = m. The dynamics of (4) will depend on which assumption one takes about the formation of expectations.
Perfect Foresi ght Dynamics
The perfect foresight assumption implies that independently of the considered past moments of time, agents will be able to accurately predict today's level of in ‡ation. Under this assumption, equation (4) will be equivalent to
The only relevant parameter to characterize in ‡ation dynamics in the simple sticky information monetary model is the parameter representing the degree of information stickiness. Because 2 (0; 1) one observes that the system is stable: convergence towards the monetary steady state is guaranteed independently of the initial state 0 . Parameter will translate the velocity of adjustment towards = m; if ! 0, no adjustment will take place (the in‡a t i o n rate su¤ers no change); if = 1, there is an instantaneous adjustment. The larger is the value of , i.e., the more ‡e x i b l e information is, the faster is the adjustment process. Figure 1 draws the time trajectory of the in ‡ation rate for 0 = 0:04 and m = 0:02, considering three di¤erent degrees of information stickiness:
= 0:25, = 0:5, = 0:75. Observe that the lower is , the slower will be the adjustment process. In deterministic terms this is the only information the model is capable of conveying, as long as one sticks with the perfect foresight / rational expectations assumption.
It is straightforward to understand that no dynamic convergence would occur if 0 = m; in this case, the system is initially at the steady-state and, in the absence of any external shock, it will remain there independently of the degree of information stickiness. For any 0 6 = m, the level of stickiness will determine how many periods are needed in order to asymptotically reach the steady-state. Note that the role of information updating gains relevance when a disturbance over the equilibrium in which the system rests occurs; a more infrequent information updating leads to a more inertial response to the shock, i.e., to a lengthier reestablishment of the initial steady-state. A crucial assumption in this paper is that the initial state is one in which the system deviates from rational expectations: by taking 0 6 = m, one is considering that the economic system is 'b o r n ' i n a state of disequilibrium and that the rational behavior of the economic agents will allow for a convergence towards the equilibrium (at a rate that depends on the available information). A possible explanation for this assumption can be found in the complete absence of knowledge about the evolution of the economy that agents might display at the initial state, i.e., initially …r m s will have to form prices without any information on how monetary policy is conducted; once economic agents perceive how money supply evolves, they will adjust their behavior accordingly. Therefore, t = 0 can be interpreted as the time period when all …r m s initiate their activity and, thus, have insu¢ cient knowledge on how the economy behaves and how authorities undertake their policies.
Learning Past Results
In this section, we assume that the ability of economic agents in predicting perfectly current in ‡ation values, independently of how far in the past they formulate expectations about the current state of the economy, is limited.
More speci…cally, we consider the assumption described in the introduction: agents possess two information sets, one concerning the state of the economy which is updated sporadically, and another one consisting on the observation of all past in ‡ation levels prior to moment t. This last information set allows agents to predict the value of the in ‡ation rate through a process of adaptive learning.
We will consider the following rule in what respects the formation of expectations:
According to rule (6), if expectations are formed in the current period, agents will know the true value of this rate; otherwise, agents will ignore any information on the state of the economy and they will just resort to the observation of the past performance of the in ‡ation rate through time t 1. Variable b t represents the estimated level of in ‡ation at t computed by resorting to all the information on through t 1. Under this hypothesis, it is straightforward to regard that
The monetary model equation (4) takes, under the established assumption, the form
(7) Note that if one eliminates the learning component (by taking b t+1 = t+1 and b t = t ), we return to the simple perfect foresight equation (5) .
Having no anticipated knowledge on the value of b , agents estimate it by acting as econometricians, i.e., by running a least squares regression. Following Bullard [1] , we consider that agents do not estimate directly a constant in ‡ation rate but a constant rate of price change, that is, the adopted perceived law of motion is the following,
In (8), P t is the price level, i.e., p t = ln P t . Estimating in t the in ‡ation rate using data available through time t 1 yields,
The expectations feedback system composed by (8) and (9) can be transformed into a recursive dynamic system. This requires introducing a gain sequence variable, which is de…ned as t := P
Variable t is known as a decreasing gain sequence since as time passes and the number of observations increases, the gain or impact of each new observation becomes smaller. The derived system of di¤erence equations is
Under our de…nition of variables,
. Equation (7) together with the learning scheme [i.e., equations (10) and (11)] form a three …r s t -o r d e r equations system with three endogenous variables: t , b t and t ; observe that equation (10) can be presented as
In the next sections, we address this model's dynamics. From a local dynamics point of view, a general analysis may be pursued; globally, one will need to calibrate the model in order to undertake a meaningful characterization of dynamic results. The benchmark calibration will be = 0:1, = 0:5 and = 0:25 (these are the values of parameters considered by Mankiw and Reis [9] in their simulation of in ‡ation dynamics under sticky information).
We will consider that parameter values re ‡ect quarterly data, and therefore the value of can be interpreted in terms of concrete calendar dates. If = 1, then information about the state of the economy is updated every quarter of year; for instance if = 0:25, this will imply that economic agents update their information on average once a year. Generalizing, one can say that for some stickiness parameter = e , the average frequency of information updating will be 1= e quarters, or 3= e months. Although theoretically might assume any value between zero and one, it is admissible to impose a plausible positive lower bound; for instance, the assumption that >0:05 indicates that information will be updated at least every 20 quarters or 60 months.
In the subsequent analysis, it does not make sense to consider a separate discussion on the impact of changes in the values of parameters and ; their e¤ect over the economic system arises always through the ratio = . The displayed quotient can assume only positive values. The benchmark case is such that the real rigidities parameter is lower than the income elasticity of money demand; however, one will observe that departures from stability will require a smaller than 1 value for the ratio = .
Dynamics under Learning
The steady-state value of the gain sequence variable is
2 . This is a positive and lower than 1 value for any m > 0. The monetary steady-state can, then, be fully displayed:
2 g. Local stability results are addressable after computing a linearized system in the vicinity of the presented steady-state. The obtained system is 
with := ( = )(1 ) + >0. Resorting to the center manifold theorem, one can exclude the third dynamic equation from the analysis, i.e., we can concentrate on the sub-matrix of the Jacobian matrix in (12) respecting to its two …r s t rows and two …r s t columns. This matrix will be designated by J and it will furnish relevant information regarding local dynamics. , then the system is locally stable 8 m > 0. Furthermore, for an information updating schedule such that 2=3, stability will prevail 8 m, , >0. . The equilibrium value of the gain sequence variable is bounded below 1, and therefore if
1, then stability is guaranteed. This last condition is equivalent to the one in the proposition.
The result in the second part of the proposition is straightforward to obtain once we evaluate inequality 2 3 4(1 ) numerically. Because the quotient = must be larger than zero, we replace the ratio by zero in the inequality and solve in order to . Straightforward computation allows to reach the boundary 2=3 Constraint 2=3 in proposition 1 indicates that introducing learning into the formation of expectations in the way we have done implies stability of the monetary steady state as long as information is updated at least every 1:5 quarters (1=0:667) or 4:5 months (3=0:667); more infrequent information updating can lead to a departure from a stability outcome, depending on the values assumed by the degree of real rigidities, the income elasticity of money demand and the growth rate of money supply.
One can approach graphically the model's local results by representing areas of local stability and instability in the space of parameters. In …g u r e 2, we draw the regions where stability holds for any admissible m (we take in consideration the constraint in proposition 1). The other region, close to the origin (i.e., for low values of both = and ), is the region in which instability is possible for at least some values of the growth rate of m.
Let us focus attention in the case of possible loss of stability. The following result applies:
. In this case, local stability will require an upper bound on the rate of money growth. In the point in which m = ln Proof. In the proof of proposition 1, we have remarked that the …r s t two stability conditions hold independently of parameter values, while the third condition imposes a constraint on the steady state value of the gain sequence: < 4( = )(1 )+2 2
. Recalling that = 1 [exp( m)] 2 , and solving in order to m, we obtain the following inequality:
Therefore, one realizes that stability requires the money growth rate to be below a given combination of parameters , and . The inequality in the proposition guarantees that the value inside the square root is positive.
Stability is eventually lost through a ‡i p bifurcation, because it is condition 1+T r(J)+Det(J) > 0 that may fail to hold. In two dimensional systems, it is well known that a ‡i p bifurcation occurs when the line 1+T r(J)+Det(J) = 0 is crossed with the other two stability conditions being satis…ed (see Medio and Lines [14] for formal de…nitions of local bifurcations). No other kind of bifurcation can occur in the speci…ed case
The relevant result that the two previous propositions imply is that when we introduce learning, we can only obtain a long term outcome that di¤ers from the perfect foresight equilibrium if there is a large degree of information stickiness, the ratio = is relatively low and the rate of growth of money supply is relatively high (implying long run scenarios of fast price growth and even situations of hyperin ‡ation). To illustrate the information proposition 2 furnishes, consider …g u r e 3. This presents the bifurcation line for di¤erent possible values of m in the space of parameters (i.e., taking into account, as in …g u r e 2, the relation between and = ). The …g u r e is drawn by rewriting the equality in proposition 2 as =
and choosing an array of values for m (in particular, we consider m = 0:1, m = 0:333 and m = 1); to the right of each one of these lines stability holds and local instability will prevail otherwise.
The dashed line in …g u r e 3 represents the boundary already displayed in …g u r e 2; as remarked then, independently of how high the rate of money growth is, stability will hold to the right of such frontier. As one considers lower possible values for this growth rate, the requirements to depart from stability become more strict, i.e., the closer the rate of money growth is to zero, the stickier prices will have to be and the lower must be the elasticity of money demand -real rigidities ratio in order for stability to be lost.
We have remarked that only fast money growth can lead to the loss of stability and eventual nonlinear dynamics (which will be characterized in the following section). Nevertheless, non conventional dynamics can arise for not too high money growth (and, thus, not too high equilibrium in ‡ation rates) in extreme cases of information stickiness, signi…cant real rigidities and a small income elasticity of money demand. For instance, if = 0:05 (the lower bound on this parameter that we have assumed earlier and that implied that information must be updated at least every 5 years) and = is a very small value, e.g., 0:0005, then the bifurcation occurs at m = 0:027, i.e., for a rate of money growth such that the equilibrium in ‡ation rate is 2:7% per quarter or 10:73% per year.
The main intuition one withdraws from the previous arguments is that we can exclude any departure from stability as long as:
a) The economy follows a responsible monetary policy; b) Agents are not excessively inattentive;
c) The degree of real rigidities is not too strong when compared with the income change occurring as a reaction to a variation in money demand.
If one of the above conditions fails signi…cantly, even if the others remain at relatively admissible levels, the steady-state in ‡ation rate may become unattainable; the failure to converge to the in ‡ation rate equilibrium level may take various forms and involve di¤erent consequences, as we will discuss in the next sections.
Endogenous Cycles
In the previous section, one has remarked that the introduction of learning will not change the perfect foresight outcome of convergence towards the monetary steady state, as long as economic conditions remain 'n o r m a l '. By a normal economic environment we understand a setting where the rate of money growth is not excessively high, the degree of inattentiveness is kept at a relatively low value, and the degree of real rigidities is relatively low when compared with the income elasticity of money demand.
In this section, we look at the consequences over global dynamics of considering such a learning environment for the formation of expectations. First, the stable outcome is addressed in terms of velocity of convergence (we compare the obtained results to the ones found in the perfect foresight case through …g u r e 1); second, we approach the exception, i.e., what are the implications of extreme economic conditions that lead to a departure from the scenario of convergence towards the monetary steady-state. In this second case, we …n d that the ‡i p bifurcation generates an area (the region locally characterized by the saddle-path outcome) where endogenous cycles emerge; these cycles are in some circumstances simple two-period cycles and, for other combinations of parameter values, quasi-periodic and chaotic ‡u c t u a t i o n s . The existence of endogenous cycles in situations where the rate of money growth is excessively high constitutes a candidate explanation for why business cycles become harder to control and predict in scenarios of hyperin ‡ation (besides the stochastic component of such ‡u c t u a t i o n s , a deterministic ‡u c t u a t i o n process is also highlighted).
Consider as a benchmark case of stability under learning the one referred in section 4 ( = 0:1, = 0:5, = 0:25). To draw a …g u r e similar to …g u r e 1, consider some initial in ‡ation rate value and a long run rate of money growth: 0 = 0:04 and m = 0:02. Besides = 0:25, take also the two alternative cases = 0:5 and = 0:75. Figure 4 presents the process of convergence of the in ‡ation rate towards the equilibrium point in the learning model. By comparing this …g u r e with …g u r e 1, no relevant di¤erences are found; the degree of inattentiveness continues to determine the velocity of convergence towards the steady-state: the stickier the information is (the lengthier is the process of expectations adjustment), the slower will be the convergence in the direction of m, i.e., in the direction of the in ‡ation rate level that prevails in the long run. Thus, although other parameters become relevant once we introduce learning (namely the ratio = ), the degree of information stickiness continues to mainly determine the pace of convergence towards the steady-state.
Recover now the exceptional cases in which the ‡i p bifurcation is crossed. The numerical -graphical evaluation of the system allows to identify circumstances in which the bifurcation simply leads to period two cycles that are perpetuated over time and cases for which complete a-periodicity and chaos prevail. Table 1 indicates, for each considered combination of parameters, the maximum periodicity cycles that may be found in each case. Note that there are also cases in which the bifurcation directs the system immediately to an unstable result, existing in these cases no cyclical motion.
An important point to remark at this stage is that initial conditions (in particular, the initial level of in ‡ation) are not relevant in what respects the long-term dynamic outcome. Every numerical experiment allows to …n d a basin of attraction that is coincident with the state space; this means that the long-run result is independent of 0 .
The presence of chaotic motion for particular parameter values can be con…rmed by computing the corresponding Lyapunov characteristic exponents Table 1 : Maximum periodicity cycles found after the bifurcation is crossed (for selected values of parameters).
(LCEs); these are a measure of exponential divergence of nearby orbits or sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC). SDIC implies that the same dynamic process with distinct initial values (even if very close) will generate completely di¤erent long term time trajectories, characterized by irregular cycles that do not converge to any steady-state or periodic orbit. Thus, SDIC is commonly associated with the notion of topological chaos. In a three dimensional system as the one considered, three LCEs exist. In practice, only the value of the largest LCE is relevant: if this is negative, a result other than chaos characterizes long term dynamics; if it is positive, we con…rm the presence of SDIC. Take, for instance, two of the cases involving chaos, presented in table 1: = 1=3; = = 0:1; m = 1 and = 0:25; = = 0:1; m = 0:35. For these, one e¤ectively encounters positive largest Lyapunov exponents (respectively, LCE = 0:077 and LCE = 0:031). All the cases for which chaos is not found will involve solely negative Lyapunov exponents.
A graphical illustration of the nonlinear results allows to better understand how the learning assumption may decisively deviate the economy's outcome from the one suggested by a world where perfect foresight prevails. In …g u r e 5, a bifurcation diagram is represented for a case where chaotic motion is identi…ed; this is the case in which = 1=3; = = 0:1. In this speci…c setting, the bifurcation occurs for m = 0:41; above this value of the rate of money growth, a period-two cycle is …r s t generated and then it leads to a region in which quasi-periodicity and then chaos will prevail. Figure 6 displays a strange attractor (the long term relation between the in ‡ation level and the learned rate of in ‡ation for the selected parameter values and for m = 1), relatively to which the presence of chaotic motion is unequivocal.
eventually never vanish and attractors di¤erent from the steady-state equilibrium might emerge. Introducing learning generates, in the referred studies as well as in the sticky information case we have considered above, long run endogenous cycles which have gained the designation of learning equilibria; their main feature is that they depend entirely on fundamental factors, i.e., it is not a third variable or an ad-hoc assumption that forces the presence of nonlinearities. In other words, learning alone produces multiple equilibria.
Using the same analytical structure and employing the same least squares learning scheme as Bullard [1] , Schonhofer [20] focuses the analysis on chaotic equilibrium trajectories. The …n d i n g of chaos in this kind of model gives a better reply to the persistent use of a learning scheme that generates systematic errors. Under a simple periodic cycles result it would be straightforward to perceive that systematic errors are being made, what would lead the representative agent to change her forecasting rule. In the presence of deterministic chaos, the persistent use of the same ine¢ cient rule may be perpetuated as agents are unable to distinguish between irregular deterministic behavior and random deviations from the fundamental solution. This justi…es the relevance we put in …n d i n g , for some combinations of parameter values, chaotic solutions. Schonhofer [21] raises precisely the question of whether agents have the ability to learn their way out of chaos and Grandmont [6] discusses the concept of 's e l f -f u l … l l i n g mistake'which is directly attached to the idea that agents are unable to distinguish between chaotic deterministic behavior and random noise, and tend to simplify reality by considering that every ‡u c t u a t i o n has a stochastic nature.
Response to Shocks
The main goal with which the sticky-information paradigm was born was to measure the impact of external shocks over the equilibrium in ‡ation rate. In Mankiw and Reis [8] , four di¤erent types of shocks and the corresponding e¤ects over the long-run in ‡ation trajectory are evaluated. In each one of the speci…ed scenarios, information stickiness will imply an inertial response to disturbances on aggregate demand (or on money supply), i.e., the maximum impact of the shock is felt only after a few time periods (8 to 10 quarters); once the maximum impact is reached, the in ‡ation rate will gradually converge once again to the steady-state value, that in this type of exercise is assumed to be = 0, for simplifying purposes. To illustrate how learning changes the response to monetary shocks, we consider the fourth experience described in Mankiw and Reis [8] . The variation in money supply is modelled as a …r s t -o r d e r autoregressive process, i.e., m t = m t 1 + " t , with j j < 1 and " t a disturbance term representing eventual perturbations over the money supply growth rate. We consider = 0:5 and the shock is modelled as " t=0 = 0:007 (" t6 =0 = 0), i.e., a negative shock over the evolution of m t occurs at t = 0. Under perfect foresight, the inertia e¤ect is evident: the impact of the monetary policy shock reveals its maximum strength only some time after the disturbance takes place; this negative e¤ect vanishes after around 20 periods. The policy experiment is conducted for = 0:1, = 1 and = 0:25.
We apply precisely the same policy experiment to our learning setup (using the same parameter values); no signi…cant qualitative di¤erences are found: the shock disturbs the in ‡ation rate path negatively, the e¤ect involves some inertia and, again, after a few periods the impact of the shock begins to vanish. The main di¤erences are that with learning the impact of the shock is less accentuated (the maximum impact over in ‡ation corresponds to less than a half of the impact in the rational expectations case) and with learning the process of recovery towards the initial state is slower. These results are displayed in …g u r e 7, where we compare the impact of the disturbance for the rational expectations case and for two learning possibilities. Learning model 1 is the case characterized in the previous sections; learning model 2 respects to an alternative speci…cation that is described in appendix C and that involves a more sophisticated learning rule, where rational expectations gradually lose weight and learning gradually gains weight as older time periods are considered.
The evident feature in …g u r e 7 is that under learning the impact of the shock is less pronounced (it will be more pronounced for the learning speci…cation in the text than for the case in appendix C, because the …r s t attributes more weight to learning). We also observe that the larger is the importance of learning (…rst learning model) the lengthier will be the convergence towards the steady-state; this is apparently an intuitive result because with learning we introduce a second element of inertia: not only information is sticky (i.e., agents are inattentive) but agents will also need time to learn the way economic aggregates evolve over time.
One can also evaluate how a change in the growth of money supply changes in ‡ation paths when nonlinearities are present. Fo cus the attention on the …r s t learning model and on the example that allowed to build the bifurcation diagram in …g u r e 5. In this case, = 1=3 and = = 0:1. A …r s t bifurcation occurs at m = 0:41 and a second bifurcation, in the transition between a period two-cycle and quasi-periodicity is observed at around m = 0:48. Thus, a one time change in the rate of money growth can have dramatic implications over the observed type of dynamics. This is illustrated in …g u r e 8. In this …g u r e , we begin by considering that m = 0:4, situation in which the system converges towards a unique equilibrium in ‡ation rate; a shock on the money supply growth rate may imply a change on the topological nature of the system, generating a di¤erent evolution pattern of in ‡ation over time. In this case, by assuming that at a moment t = 50, the growth rate of m t becomes m = 0:5, one e¤ectively observes a relevant change in the long-run behavior of the in ‡ation rate -now, it evolves a-periodically. As a result, a permanent change in the equilibrium rate of money growth not only changes the average in ‡ation rate, it also modi…es the qualitative behavior of the time path of in ‡ation: from a …x e d -p o i nt stability result = 0:4, the system has jumped to an irregular movement around the new steady-state = 0:5. Therefore, by allowing for the possibility of stronger rates of money growth, the central bank may be opening the door for an ine¤ective monetary policy: although the rate of money growth remains constant over time, the in ‡ation rate will no longer evolve following a pattern of stability.
Conclusion
The question asked in this paper is whether the departure from the perfect foresight assumption in a deterministic version of the sticky information macro model produces relevant changes in terms of the obtained stability results. In the assumed setting, if expectations about the value of the in ‡ation rate today are generated today, then perfect foresight prevails; if the update of information is made in any moment of the past, such information about the state of the economy will be simply ignored in favour of resorting to the known past performance of the in ‡ation rate, which allows to predict the current value. 4 The adopted least squares learning algorithm through which in ‡ation is (partially) forecasted discloses a relevant role of the degree of sticky information in determining stability. While under perfect foresight the degree of information updating only in ‡uences the velocity of convergence towards the steady-state, the inclusion of learning allows for the loss of stability when the information updating process is strongly sluggish. Other parameters also determine the stability outcome: if the extent of real rigidities (e.g., externalities or …n a n c i a l market imperfections) is large (relatively to the income elasticity of money demand), convergence towards the monetary steady-state may as well be compromised. One has also remarked that divergence from the equilibrium only occurs for relatively large rates of growth of money supply, indicating an association, which appears elsewhere in the literature, between nonlinearities and cases of hyperin ‡ation.
The studied dynamic system allows for a loss of stability only through a ‡i p bifurcation. This leads in most of the circumstances to cycles of periodicity 2, which can degenerate in some of the cases into quasi-periodicity and chaos. Chaotic results are particularly relevant because they possibly imply the presence of systematic errors that the agents cannot separate from random noise. Imagining that cycles are identi…able with stochastic processes, agents will have no incentive to switch to another, better performing, learning algorithm (which in the present case would mean to estimate directly the in ‡ation rate and not the dynamic behavior of prices).
The analysis of the reaction of in ‡ation to monetary policy shocks indicates that learning produces a less severe e¤ect of disturbances over price changes, although such e¤ect is felt over a wider range of time periods. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks gain a deeper relevance when nonlinearities are observed, since such shocks may change the qualitative nature of the results allowing a …x e d -p o i nt outcome to be transformed into an irregular path or vice-versa. This last feature has important implications concerning public policy; if the monetary authorities are able to perceive that the main source of ‡u c t u a t i o n s is endogenous, then they may be able to identify in what extent the rate of money growth needs to be changed in order to stabilize the evolution of prices.
Replacing (a1) into (3) in order to remove the output gap and its growth rate from the expression of the sticky-information Phillips curve, the following relation is obtained:
To present (a2), one has kept in mind that
(1 ) j = 1= . Equation (a2) establishes a relation between prices and money supply; this relation becomes easier to analyze if one applies …r s t -d i ¤e r e n c e s . In this way, the relation will simply involve the constant rate of money growth and the value of the in ‡ation rate in two consecutive time moments. Straightforward algebra will conduct to equation (4) as presented in the text.
Appendix B -Details on Monetary Policy
The paper has considered the most simple approach to monetary policy. This was done for the sake of tractability, however the model can be easily extended in order to include a more realistic characterization of monetary policy. In this appendix, we brie ‡y explain how monetary policy decisions could be endogenously modelled, by assuming that the nominal interest rate is an endogenous variable that the central bank may control in order to in ‡uence the macroeconomic outcome, both in real and nominal terms. Consider a static and deterministic IS relation 5 :
where i t represents the nominal interest rate. The IS equation presents the conventional relation of opposite sign between the real interest rate and the output gap. The interest rate can be determined optimally, given some objective function of the monetary authority or, alternatively, a Taylor rule can be applied. Such rule can take the form:
Parameter i represents the equilibrium nominal interest rate. The Taylor rule describes how the central bank will react to changes in the state variables, i.e., to changes in the values of the in ‡ation rate and of the output gap. 6 By replacing the interest rate in (a4) into (a3), we …n d the following relation between the output gap and the in ‡ation rate: 6 As with the IS equation, the Taylor rule can take slightly di¤erent forms. For instance, the interest rate may react not to the observed in ‡ation rate but to the expected in ‡ation rate (or to the di¤erence between the expected in ‡ation and an in ‡ation rate target de…ned by the central bank).
If one replaces the value of the output gap as presented above into the sticky-information Phillips curve, (3), we will obtain a dynamic equation with a single endogenous variable -the in ‡ation rate. That equation could be analyzed under learning in the same way one has proceeded with equation (4) . The main di¤erence is that in such case one would not have the change in money supply as the policy instrument; the parameters subject to the eventual manipulation of the authorities would be the ones we have just speci…ed: ' 0 ; ' 1 ; i ; and y . Thus, the option for such a non elaborated speci…cation of monetary policy has served the purpose of analyzing in ‡ation dynamics having in mind a single bifurcation parameter that comprises the whole of the monetary policy actions that can be followed by the central bank.
Appendix C -An Alternative Speci…cation
In this appendix, we take a di¤erent assumption in terms of formation of expectations relatively to the one in section 4; the goal is to check the robustness of the model's results by analyzing a more sophisticated rule of in ‡ation expectations; results will be similar in qualitative terms, although they will be closer to the ones in the original model, given that a less relevant role is attributed to the learning component in the formation of expectations. Instead of considering learning for every time period previous to t, we will assume that the capacity to perfectly predict today's in ‡ation rate fades away as we consider more distant in the past time moments. The assumption is analytically translated in the following expectations formation rule:
As before, b t respects to the estimated level of in ‡ation at t computed by resorting to all the information on through t 1. The intuition is as follows: when j = 0, expectations about in ‡ation are formed in the present moment, and therefore agents know with absolute certainty that the in ‡ation rate is t ; in the opposite circumstance, when j ! 1, information about the state of the economy was updated so far in the past that agents will display no ability to generate accurate perfect foresight expectations on t ; thus, they will fully resort to the learning procedure in order to predict in ‡ation, i.e., lim
Between the extreme time moments t and t N, expectations will be formed by weighting both the information on the state of the economy and the time series of the in ‡ation rate. The weight of the perfect foresight component falls the larger is the distance of the generation of information period relatively to the present moment. Note that the sum of the weights in (a6) is 1, meaning that the relative increase of weight of one of the expectation rules is made at the expenses of the other: as the ability to produce perfect foresight expectations falls, the larger will be the relevance agents attribute to learning. This departs from the …r s t speci…cation in the sense that then perfect foresight was possible only in the present moment and it would be absent from the formation of expectations in any past moment, while now such ability will fade away in a progressive way as we go back in time.
Recover the sticky-information term of the in ‡ation dynamic equation in (4) . Replacing in such term the in ‡ation expectations by the expression in (a6) yields the following equality:
The following (exact) series results hold,
Thus, we further simplify the past expectations term,
To better understand the relation between the degree of information stickiness and the series of past expectations, we rearrange (a7) to write the equality as
Expression (a8) allows to characterize how di¤erent degrees of stickiness lead to a departure from the perfect foresight outcome. Consider precisely the perfect foresight benchmark case. In this situation, the l.h.s. of (a8) is equal to 1; such result arises only in the instantaneous information updating case, i.e., for = 1. The value of the expression in (a8) will fall below 1 for <1, with such value being as much lower as the lower is the value of the information ; this is an increasing and concave function where we e¤ectively observe that f(1) = 1. Therefore, one concludes that the larger is the degree of information stickiness, the more the ratio in the l.h.s. of (a8) will depart from 1, and this essentially means that the larger is the degree of information stickiness, the more the
(1 ) j E t j ( t ) will depart from the perfect foresight outcome t .
Replacing expectations, as presented in (a7), into the in ‡ation dynamics equation (4), one obtains:
As in the …r s t explored case, taking b t+1 = t+1 and b t = t would imply returning to the benchmark perfect foresight setting, i.e., the learning component would be eliminated. Equation (a9) together with (10) and (11), will constitute the new dynamic model relatively to which one intends to address stability properties. We follow the same procedure as in the …r s t model, i.e., we begin by linearizing the system in the steady-state vicinity [the steady-state ( ; b ; ) is exactly the same as in the …r s t version of the model], (a10) with e := ( = )(1 ) + ( = 1) ln . Again, resorting to the center manifold theorem, which allows to restrict the local analysis to the sub-matrix e J of the Jacobian matrix in expression (a10) composed by the …r s t two rows and the …r s t two columns, one withdraws the main stability properties of the system.
Proposition 3 If
(1 )(2 )+2 (1 +2 ln ) 4(1 + ln )
, then the system is locally stable 8 m > 0. For a degree of information stickiness such that 0:383, stability will hold independently of the values of m, and .
Proof. Trace and determinant of e J are, respectively, T r( e J) = 2
and Det( e J) = 1 . The equilibrium value of the gain sequence variable is bounded below 1, and therefore if 4 e 2(1 ) (1 ) (2 ) 1, then stability is guaranteed. This last inequality is equivalent to the one presented in the proposition.
Recalling that = must be larger than zero, if the r.h.s. of the inequality is non negative one guarantees the presence of stability for any positive rate of money supply; this value is above (or equal to) zero as long as 0:383 The condition 0:383 indicates that introducing learning into the formation of expectations in the way we have just done implies stability of the monetary steady state as long as information is updated at least every 2:611 quarters (1=0:383) or 7: 832 9 months (3=0:383); more infrequent information updating can lead to a departure from the stability outcome, depending on the values assumed by the degree of real rigidities, the income elasticity of money demand and the growth rate of money supply.
The limit value of above which stability is guaranteed is lower in the present case than in the …r s t model's speci…cation. This is intuitively correct, because in the current case we attribute a less signi…cant role to learning (relatively to perfect foresight); therefore, the loss of stability can only occur for relatively larger values of information stickiness (lower values of parameter ).
If the possibility of loss of stability is present, we can state the following result. . In this case, local stability will require an upper bound on the rate of money growth. In the point in which m = ln q (1 )(2 ) (1 )(2 )+2 (1 +2 ln ) 4( = ) (1 + ln ) , a ‡i p bifurcation occurs.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is straightforward: consider the inequality found in the previous proposition's proof, < 4 e 2(1 ) (1 ) (2 ) ; by recalling that = 1 [exp( m)] 2 and by rearranging this inequality, one arrives to: Therefore, one realizes that stability requires the money growth rate to be below a given combination of parameters , and . The inequality in the proposition guarantees that the value inside the square root is positive.
As in the …r s t discussed case, it is condition 1 + T r( e J) + Det( e J) > 0 that may not hold. In the point at which 1 + T r( e J) + Det( e J) = 0, a ‡i p bifurcation takes place A contour plot similar to the one in …g u r e 3 can be presented for the case now in appreciation. Figure 10 takes, once again, the values m = 0:1, m = 0:333 and m = 1 to draw the corresponding bifurcation lines. These have a similar pattern relatively to the one characterized in …g u r e 3, but now the conditions for the loss of stability are more strict: a stronger level of information stickiness is required, and the value of the ratio = needs to be lower for each value of m.
To arrive to the lines in …g u r e 10, one has to rewrite the ‡i p bifurcation condition in proposition 4 in the following way: The values of = in the limit case = 0 is the same as in the …r s t proposed scenario, but the values of for each m in the extreme point = = 0 are lower; as a result, larger degrees of inattentiveness are now needed to depart from stability (for the same rate of money growth). As in …g u r e 3, the area below each bifurcation line represents local instability, while stability prevails for combinations of parameter values locating above the represented lines.
Given the qualitative similarities with the case addressed in the body of text, we omit a thorough graphical analysis concerning both local and global dynamics. From a global point of view, we …n d a similar type of outcomes: under stability, the frequency of information updating is determinant in what respects the velocity of convergence (once more, the smaller is , the slower will be the convergence process). The breakdown of stability generates as well a region of cyclical motion. Table 2 indicates, for selected parameter values, the type of dynamics that is installed. As in the benchmark case, period 2 cycles dominate but quasi-periodicity and chaotic motion are possible in some cases, with the relevant consequences we have already mentioned. Figure 11 presents a bifurcation diagram for a setting where quasi-periodicity is identi…ed, but chaotic motion is absent (irregular cycles are displayed, however they do not represent a situation of complete divergence of nearby orbits); this is the case in which = 0:1; = = 0:15. In this speci…c setting, the bifurcation occurs at m = 0:552; above this value of the rate of money growth, a period two cycle is …r s t generated and then it leads to a region in which quasi-periodic cycles will hold. Figure 12 displays an attractor, i.e., the long term relation between the in ‡ation level and the learned rate of in ‡ation for a set of parameter values ( = 0:1; = = 0:1; m = 2) relatively to which the presence of chaotic motion is clear. 
